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Government protection against terrorism and crime

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  • Kjell Hausken
  • Dipak K. Gupta

Abstract

A game theoretic model is developed where a government protects against a terrorist seeking terrorism and criminal objectives. A terrorist can recruit a benefactor providing funds by remaining ideologically pure, or may resort to crime. The model accounts for the players’ resources, unit costs of effort, unit benefit and valuations and contest intensities for terrorist and crime objectives. We determine and quantify how these factors and the government impact a terrorist’s terrorism and crime efforts and relative ideological orientation on a continuum from being highly ideological to being highly criminal. We also consider how the terrorist group is impacted by support of benefactor(s), the central authority’s ability to impose greater sanctions for terrorist activities compared to criminal actions and the ideological orientation of the group’s leadership. We discuss insights from the model and consider a few historical perspectives.

Suggested Citation

  • Kjell Hausken & Dipak K. Gupta, 2015. "Government protection against terrorism and crime," Global Crime, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(2), pages 59-80, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:fglcxx:v:16:y:2015:i:2:p:59-80
    DOI: 10.1080/17440572.2015.1019612
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    Cited by:

    1. Zhiheng Xu & Jun Zhuang, 2019. "A Study on a Sequential One‐Defender‐N‐Attacker Game," Risk Analysis, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 39(6), pages 1414-1432, June.
    2. Kjell Hausken, 2020. "Governmental combat of migration between competing terrorist organisations," Operations Research and Decisions, Wroclaw University of Science and Technology, Faculty of Management, vol. 30(3), pages 21-46.
    3. Hausken, Kjell, 2019. "The dynamics of terrorist organizations," Operations Research Perspectives, Elsevier, vol. 6(C).
    4. Hausken, Kjell, 2019. "Governmental combat of the dynamics of multiple competing terrorist organizations," Mathematics and Computers in Simulation (MATCOM), Elsevier, vol. 166(C), pages 33-55.

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