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Disclosure Regulation in Duopoly Markets: Proprietary Costs and Social Welfare

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  • Jeroen Suijs
  • Jacco L. Wielhouwer

Abstract

The argument of proprietary costs is commonly used by firms to object against proposed disclosure regulations. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of the welfare consequences of disclosure in duopoly markets and to identify market settings where proprietary costs are a viable argument for firms to remain silent. We, therefore, solve the optimal disclosure strategies and distinguish two different potentially costly effects of disclosing private information: the strategic information effect and the market information effect. We identify the market settings for which a regulator prefers to impose disclosure regulation so as to maximise consumer surplus or total surplus. Regulation may be necessary because (i) the increase in welfare outweighs proprietary costs to the firms, or (ii) firms are trapped in a prisoners' dilemma. The first primarily applies to Bertrand competition with demand uncertainty and, to a lesser extent, to Cournot competition. The second applies primarily to Cournot competition and Bertrand competition with cost uncertainty.

Suggested Citation

  • Jeroen Suijs & Jacco L. Wielhouwer, 2014. "Disclosure Regulation in Duopoly Markets: Proprietary Costs and Social Welfare," European Accounting Review, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 23(2), pages 227-255, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:euract:v:23:y:2014:i:2:p:227-255
    DOI: 10.1080/09638180.2013.835245
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Alexandra Lilge & Abhishek Ramchandani, 2024. "To tell or not to tell: the incentive effects of disclosing employer assessments," Review of Accounting Studies, Springer, vol. 29(3), pages 2832-2870, September.
    2. Mark Bagnoli & Susan G. Watts, 2015. "Competitive intelligence and disclosure," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 46(4), pages 709-729, October.
    3. Kazunori Miwa, 2021. "An Experimental Study on Information Acquisition and Disclosure in a Cournot Duopoly Market," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 13-01-Rev, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    4. Jeremy Bertomeu & Edwige Cheynel, 2016. "Disclosure and the Cost of Capital: A Survey of the Theoretical Literature," Abacus, Accounting Foundation, University of Sydney, vol. 52(2), pages 221-258, June.
    5. Hui Chen & Bjorn N. Jorgensen, 2022. "Insider Trading, Competition, and Real Activities Manipulation," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(2), pages 1497-1511, February.
    6. Jeremy Bertomeu & Pierre Jinghong Liang, 2015. "Disclosure Policy and Industry Fluctuations," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 61(6), pages 1292-1305, June.
    7. Kazunori Miwa, 2016. "Welfare Effects of Endogenous Information Acquisition and Disclosure in Duopoly Markets," Discussion Paper Series DP2016-17, Research Institute for Economics & Business Administration, Kobe University.

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