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Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information

Author

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  • Tarun Kabiraj
  • Srobonti Chattopadhyay

Abstract

This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-�-vis non-cooperative research in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down compared to the case of symmetric information; hence research joint venture incentives of the firms are larger under asymmetric information. In either case, however, the larger is the size of the cost-reducing innovation the lower is the incentive for cooperative research. Finally, in our model, incomplete information does not affect the consumers' welfare, but the firms become worse off.

Suggested Citation

  • Tarun Kabiraj & Srobonti Chattopadhyay, 2015. "Cooperative vs. non-cooperative R&D incentives under incomplete information," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 24(6), pages 624-632, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ecinnt:v:24:y:2015:i:6:p:624-632
    DOI: 10.1080/10438599.2014.991138
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    Cited by:

    1. Chiara Conti & Marco A. Marini, 2019. "Are you the right partner? R&D agreement as a screening device," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 28(3), pages 243-264, April.
    2. Deming Zeng & Luyun Xu & Xia-an Bi, 2017. "Effects of asymmetric knowledge spillovers on the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 32-60, March.
    3. Chatterjee, Rittwik & Chattopadhyay, Srobonti & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2020. "R&D incentives with uncertain probability of success," MPRA Paper 98474, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Abhishek Kabiraj, 2018. "R&D cooperation in a three-firm Cournot industry," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 38(3), pages 1541-1546.
    5. Kabiraj, Abhishek & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2018. "On the Choice of R&D Organization," MPRA Paper 87503, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Kabiraj, Abhishek & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2019. "Uncertain R&D Outcomes and Cooperation in R&D," MPRA Paper 94676, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Chatterjee, Rittwik & Kabiraj, Tarun, 2023. "Cooperative vs. Non-cooperative R&D under Uncertain Probability of Success," MPRA Paper 117623, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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