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Asymmetric Spillovers And Investments In Research And Development Of Leaders And Followers

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  • Jan Vandekerckhove
  • Raymond De Bondt

Abstract

The focus of this paper is on the incentives of firms to invest in research and development (R&D) when sequential moves are taken into account. Leading firms move before followers in investment and in output choices in a four stage game setting. Leaders may compete or cooperate in R&D with other leaders, given that followers compete. Followers may compete or cooperate in R&D with other followers given that leaders compete. There may be spillovers between leaders and between followers and also between these two groups of players. Due to the complexity of the model, results are obtained by numerical simulations. The impact of symmetric spillovers is similar but not identical to the tendencies in two stage models with simultaneous R&D moves. A relatively wide set of circumstances is identified where followers tend to invest more than leaders. Critical spillover values are identified that drive the effects of cooperation in R&D as is the case in simpler settings. Situations are detailed, where consumer surplus and static welfare are best served by cooperation of followers rather than cooperation of leaders.

Suggested Citation

  • Jan Vandekerckhove & Raymond De Bondt, 2008. "Asymmetric Spillovers And Investments In Research And Development Of Leaders And Followers," Economics of Innovation and New Technology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 17(5), pages 417-433.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:ecinnt:v:17:y:2008:i:5:p:417-433
    DOI: 10.1080/10438590701356041
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Raymond De Bondt & Jan Vandekerckhove, 2012. "Reflections on the Relation Between Competition and Innovation," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 12(1), pages 7-19, March.
    2. Stéphane Lhuillery, 2011. "Absorptive capacity, efficiency effect and competitors’ spillovers," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 21(4), pages 649-663, October.
    3. Cristiano Antonelli & Gianluigi Ferraris, 2011. "Innovation as an Emerging System Property: An Agent Based Simulation Model," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 14(2), pages 1-1.
    4. Stéphane Lhuillery, 2009. "In search of lost disincentive effect from intra-industry spillovers," CEMI Working Papers cemi-workingpaper-2009-00, Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale de Lausanne, Collège du Management de la Technologie, Management of Technology and Entrepreneurship Institute, Chaire en Economie et Management de l'Innovation.
    5. Cristiano, Antonelli & Ferraris, Gianluigi, 2009. "Innovation as an Emerging System Property: an Agent Based Model," Department of Economics and Statistics Cognetti de Martiis LEI & BRICK - Laboratory of Economics of Innovation "Franco Momigliano", Bureau of Research in Innovation, Complexity and Knowledge, Collegio 200911, University of Turin.
    6. Cassandra C Wang, 2015. "Geography of Knowledge Sourcing, Search Breadth and Depth Patterns, and Innovative Performance: A Firm Heterogeneity Perspective," Environment and Planning A, , vol. 47(3), pages 744-761, March.
    7. Deming Zeng & Luyun Xu & Xia-an Bi, 2017. "Effects of asymmetric knowledge spillovers on the stability of horizontal and vertical R&D cooperation," Computational and Mathematical Organization Theory, Springer, vol. 23(1), pages 32-60, March.
    8. Ishikawa, Nana & Shibata, Takashi, 2021. "R&D competition and cooperation with asymmetric spillovers in an oligopoly market," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 72(C), pages 624-642.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cost-reducing R&D; Sequential game; Cooperation; Asymmetric spillovers; Asymmetric spillovers; JEL Classification ; D72; D43; L13;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets

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