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The timing of third-party intervention in social conflict

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  • Yang-Ming Chang
  • Zijun Luo
  • Yongjing Zhang

Abstract

This paper analyzes how the equilibrium outcome of social conflict between factions is strategically altered by third-party intervention. We consider an intervening third party that commits financial support to one of two contending factions for reducing its cost in conflict. Within the framework of three-player sequential-move games, we investigate the questions as follows. What is the optimal intervention intensity in terms of the third party’s financial support? Is there a first-mover advantage in conflict when there is third-party intervention? Fighting against all odds, will the unsupported faction have a chance to prevail when its opponent receives third-party support? What is the optimal timing of third-party intervention? The analysis in the paper has implications for the conditions under which the strategic intervention of a third party may or may not break a conflict between factions.

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  • Yang-Ming Chang & Zijun Luo & Yongjing Zhang, 2018. "The timing of third-party intervention in social conflict," Defence and Peace Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 29(2), pages 91-110, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:defpea:v:29:y:2018:i:2:p:91-110
    DOI: 10.1080/10242694.2015.1126918
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    Cited by:

    1. João Ricardo Faria & Andreas Novak & Aniruddha Bagchi & Timothy Mathews, 2020. "The Refugee Game: The Relationship between Individual Security Expenditures and Collective Security," Games, MDPI, vol. 11(2), pages 1-13, June.

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