Institutional design of Ghana and the Fourth Republic: on the checks and balances between the state and society

The paper interrogates Ghana’s institutional design efforts since the 1950s and argues that the longstanding political stability of the current Fourth Republic notwithstanding, a perennial feature of all regimes is the assumption that the state has the capacity and willingness to check itself. The Fourth Republic has two flaws. First, the three arms of government – executive, legislature and judiciary – must put each other in check, and society is only mainly invited to vote in four-year cycles. Society must trust the state to exhibit goodwill. The second flaw, which is the more problematic, is the apportioning of unfettered power of appointment and dismissal to the executive, which disproportionately overshadows the two other arms of government. Using extensive archival data, local media and secondary sources, the paper interrogates the power dynamics between the state and society over time. The conclusion is that neither a very strong state nor a disproportionately assertive society is good for political stability. A weak state and a dormant society are no better options either. Ghana’s civil society has contributed to taming the power of a strong state, and that is the best promise for sustaining the current regime if it continues on this pathway responsibly.