Policy-making for immigration and integration in Québec: degenerative politics or business as usual?

Policy Design Theory (PDT) predicts that the distribution of the costs and benefits of governmental intervention depends on the social construction and level of power of target groups. The case of Québec, Canada, which recently went through acrimonious policy debates on immigration and integration issues, does not correspond to this pattern. Degenerative politics – that is, the stigmatization of powerless groups and an unequal distribution of the costs and benefits of governmental intervention to the detriment of the most vulnerable – did not occur even if the conditions were seemingly in place to produce it. Using Québec as a ‘most likely’ case, I show that the policy-making sphere remained immune to the degenerative dynamics that took hold in the media and the legislature. More precisely, I argue that three interrelated factors explain the results: past policies and their unintended consequences, an implementation structure committed to the needs of immigrants, and the specific incentive structure facing political actors. The results question the transferability of PDT outside of the institutional setting of the USA, where it was first developed and applied.