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Doing Away with the Sovereign: Neoliberalism and the Promotion of Market Discipline in European Economic Governance

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  • Markus Ojala

Abstract

This article proposes a critical reading of market discipline and its limitations as a mechanism in European economic governance. Consistent with neoliberal beliefs about market-based governance, the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is premised on the functioning of the government bond market as a fiscal-policy discipliner. However, the operation of market discipline requires that neither governments nor their private creditors can rely on an authority to bail them out. It, therefore, precludes the kinds of intervention by Eurozone’s supranational institutions witnessed during the euro crisis. In the post-crisis context, efforts to strengthen market discipline continue to be frustrated by the growing reliance of financial institutions on government bond markets as well as the European Central Bank’s (ECB) active participation in those markets. Having undermined the credibility of the market as an autonomous and apolitical mechanism of discipline, European economic governance struggles to come to terms with the rise of a supranational ‘economic sovereign’ in the Eurozone.

Suggested Citation

  • Markus Ojala, 2021. "Doing Away with the Sovereign: Neoliberalism and the Promotion of Market Discipline in European Economic Governance," New Political Economy, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 26(1), pages 203-215, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:cnpexx:v:26:y:2021:i:1:p:203-215
    DOI: 10.1080/13563467.2020.1729714
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