IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/applec/v56y2024i44p5318-5327.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Calcutta auctions

Author

Listed:
  • Matt E. Ryan
  • Dan Smolsky

Abstract

This analysis is the first study to examine an emergent wagering market: the Calcutta auction. Participants in Calcutta auctions bid for entrants that compete to earn a pre-determined percentage of an unknown total pot size. Utilizing 13-year data from an in-person Calcutta auction of NCAA men’s basketball tournament teams, evidence exists of a traditional favourite-longshot bias, of lower overall returns existing for teams in the middle of the team quality distribution and of auction participants being unable to correctly identify (through higher bids) teams that ultimately win more games after their quality is taken into account.

Suggested Citation

  • Matt E. Ryan & Dan Smolsky, 2024. "Calcutta auctions," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(44), pages 5318-5327, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:56:y:2024:i:44:p:5318-5327
    DOI: 10.1080/00036846.2023.2244254
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1080/00036846.2023.2244254
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/00036846.2023.2244254?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:56:y:2024:i:44:p:5318-5327. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAEC20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.