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The influence of the number of statewide legislative referendums on voter participation in the US

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  • Richard Cebula
  • Christopher Coombs

Abstract

This empirical study seeks to broaden the interpretation of the 'rational voter model' so as to include the potential effects of the number of statewide legislative referendums. This study tests the hypothesis that greater numbers of such referendums increase voter turnout because they elevate the Expected Gross Benefits (EGB) of voting by 'empowering voters' while not significantly increasing the Expected Gross Costs (EGC) of voting. Using state-level data for the 2006 general election in the US, as well as the 2004 US Presidential election, and after allowing for a variety of economic and demographic factors, this study finds compelling evidence that the number of statewide legislative referendums does significantly increase voter turnout.

Suggested Citation

  • Richard Cebula & Christopher Coombs, 2011. "The influence of the number of statewide legislative referendums on voter participation in the US," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(21), pages 2823-2831.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:43:y:2011:i:21:p:2823-2831
    DOI: 10.1080/00036840903389820
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Attiat F. Ott & Richard J. Cebula (ed.), 2006. "The Elgar Companion to Public Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3537.
    2. Anthony Downs, 1957. "An Economic Theory of Political Action in a Democracy," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 65(2), pages 135-135.
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