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Is the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism conditioned by the financial system? The cases of Chile and Spain

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  • Paolo Saona
  • Eleuterio Vallelado

Abstract

We test whether the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism is conditioned by the financial system in which firms operate. Our results indicate that the legal and institutional environment determines the use of bank debt to finance growth opportunities. Firms use bank debt to finance their growth opportunities when the country's banking system contributes to solving agency and asymmetric information problems and avoiding information monopoly costs. The evolutionary process of the financial systems in each country means that market imperfections such as information asymmetry or agency costs can have a diverse influence on firms' bank debt decisions.

Suggested Citation

  • Paolo Saona & Eleuterio Vallelado, 2010. "Is the use of bank debt as a governance mechanism conditioned by the financial system? The cases of Chile and Spain," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 42(13), pages 1709-1726.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:42:y:2010:i:13:p:1709-1726
    DOI: 10.1080/00036840701736065
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    Cited by:

    1. McWay, Ryan & Saona, Paolo & Muro, Laura & Jara, Mauricio, 2019. "Contrasting Incentives for Earnings Management: Board Activity and Board Remuneration in Spanish Firms," OSF Preprints xgn3y, Center for Open Science.
    2. Bin Liu & Charles Cullinan & Junrui Zhang & Fangjun Wang, 2016. "Loan guarantees and the cost of debt: evidence from China," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 48(38), pages 3626-3643, August.
    3. David Abad & Juan Pedro Sánchez-Ballesta & José Yagüe, 2017. "The short-term debt choice under asymmetric information," SERIEs: Journal of the Spanish Economic Association, Springer;Spanish Economic Association, vol. 8(3), pages 261-285, August.
    4. Esther Del Brio & Elida Maia-Ramires & Alberto De Miguel, 2011. "Ownership structure and diversification in a scenario of weak shareholder protection," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 43(29), pages 4537-4547.
    5. Paolo Saona & Laura Muro & Pablo San Martín & Carlos Cid, 2020. "Ibero-American corporate ownership and boards of directors: implementation and impact on firm value in Chile and Spain," Economic Research-Ekonomska Istraživanja, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 33(1), pages 2138-2170, January.

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