IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/taf/apfiec/v18y2008i13p1051-1066.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The market response to information quality shocks: the case of Enron

Author

Listed:
  • Peter Dunne
  • Haim Falk
  • John Forker
  • Ronan Powell

Abstract

Relying on the market to provide incentives that would bring about optimal information quality is potentially a cost effective alternative to regulatory oversight. However, this depends on the ability of the market to recognize and price this attribute. In this article, we gain insights into the disciplinary role of the market by examining its response to Enron-related accounting scandals. We report evidence that information quality was in decline, leading upto the Enron-related scandals, but that the market was not sensitive to this decline. We confirm, however, that there was an abrupt decline in perceived information quality post-Enron. Furthermore, using an ex-ante methodology we provide strong evidence that auditor reputations were differentially affected by the scandals. We also find evidence that the Enron-related scandals adversely affected the market risk premium implying that information quality is part of systematic risk. Our results indicate that the market was operating effectively in recognizing lower quality information through an auditor reputation effect prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This calls into question the need for regulation to address the perceived deficit in information quality.

Suggested Citation

  • Peter Dunne & Haim Falk & John Forker & Ronan Powell, 2008. "The market response to information quality shocks: the case of Enron," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(13), pages 1051-1066.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apfiec:v:18:y:2008:i:13:p:1051-1066
    DOI: 10.1080/09603100701439341
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09603100701439341
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1080/09603100701439341?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Francis, Jennifer & Olsson, Per & Schipper, Katherine, 2005. "Call Options and Accruals Quality," SIFR Research Report Series 34, Institute for Financial Research.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Brivot, Marion & Cho, Charles H. & Kuhn, John R., 2015. "Marketing or parrhesia: A longitudinal study of AICPA's shifting languages in times of turbulence," CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON ACCOUNTING, Elsevier, vol. 31(C), pages 23-43.
    2. Totok Budisantoso & Rahmawati Rahmawati & Bandi Bandi & Agung Nur Probohudono, 2017. "Audit Opinion Accuracy, Corporate Governance and Downward Auditor Switching: A Study of Association of Southeast Asian Nations Economics Community," International Journal of Economics and Financial Issues, Econjournals, vol. 7(5), pages 530-540.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. repec:mth:ijafr8:v:8:y:2018:i:2:p:1-25 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Benjamin E. Hermalin & Michael S. Weisbach, 2012. "Information Disclosure and Corporate Governance," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 67(1), pages 195-234, February.
    3. Rydqvist, Kristian, 2010. "Tax Arbitrage with Risk and Effort Aversion - Swedish Lottery Bonds 1970-1990," SIFR Research Report Series 70, Institute for Financial Research.
    4. Dreber, Anna & Rand, David G. & Garcia, Justin R. & Wernerfelt, Nils & Lum, J. Koji & Zeckhauser, Richard, 2010. "Dopamine and Risk Preferences in Different Domains," Working Paper Series rwp10-012, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:taf:apfiec:v:18:y:2008:i:13:p:1051-1066. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Chris Longhurst (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.tandfonline.com/RAFE20 .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.