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Substitutes versus complements among credit risk management tools

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  • Matthew Sackett
  • Sherrill Shaffer

Abstract

Practitioners, regulators and researchers have long recognized important conceptual distinctions among screening, monitoring and collection of loans. However, virtually no empirical studies have explored whether these tools of risk management are employed as net substitutes or as net complements. This paper finds evidence that, across the US banking industry, screening and monitoring behave as net substitutes but collection is complementary to screening and monitoring. A subset of low-risk banks suggests that best practices may involve net substitutability between each pair of these tools and, further, that any weakness in screening is fully offset by strength in monitoring and vice versa.

Suggested Citation

  • Matthew Sackett & Sherrill Shaffer, 2006. "Substitutes versus complements among credit risk management tools," Applied Financial Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(14), pages 1007-1017.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:apfiec:v:16:y:2006:i:14:p:1007-1017
    DOI: 10.1080/09603100600841878
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Francis, Bill B. & Hasan, Iftekhar & Küllü, A. Melih & Zhou, Mingming, 2018. "Should banks diversify or focus? Know thyself: The role of abilities," Economic Systems, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 106-118.
    2. Tan Zhongming & Samuel Frimpong & Ding Guoping, 2019. "Impact of Financial Risk Indicators on Banks' Financial Performance in Ghana," Business and Economic Research, Macrothink Institute, vol. 9(4), pages 23-52, December.

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