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Bargaining versus non-cooperation; transaction costs within marriage

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  • Jonathan Seaton

Abstract

Household labour supply models, which assume separate utility functions for the two principle household members, can be categorized as either non-cooperative or Pareto efficient bargaining games. In this paper a revealed preference non-parametric test is applied to UK family expenditure data to determine why some data observations are consistent with a Pareto efficient outcome. The empirical findings support the view that there are costs of bargaining within marriage and that they are typically related to the cost of female time. The implication being that as the cost of female time increases so do the transaction costs associated with a bargaining outcome.

Suggested Citation

  • Jonathan Seaton, 2001. "Bargaining versus non-cooperation; transaction costs within marriage," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 37-41.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:8:y:2001:i:1:p:37-41
    DOI: 10.1080/135048501750041268
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    Cited by:

    1. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2006. "Les modèles non unitaires de comportement du ménage : un survol de la littérature," L'Actualité Economique, Société Canadienne de Science Economique, vol. 82(1), pages 9-52, mars-juin.
    2. Connie Bayudan, 2006. "Portfolio decomposition and intrahousehold environments: evidence from Bangladesh," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 13(3), pages 147-152.
    3. Jonathan Seaton, 2009. "A nonparametric revealed preference test of optimal intra-firm resource allocation," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(27), pages 3463-3476.
    4. Donni, Olivier & Molina, José Alberto, 2018. "Household Collective Models: Three Decades of Theoretical Contributions and Empirical Evidence," IZA Discussion Papers 11915, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
    5. R. Swaby & A. O. Abdulkadri, 2007. "Should husband and wife really pool their incomes?," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 14(11), pages 813-816.
    6. Bautista Lacambra, Sergio, 2020. "Household labor supply: Collective results for certain developed countries," MPRA Paper 101514, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Chiappori, Pierre-André & Donni, Olivier, 2009. "Non-unitary Models of Household Behavior: A Survey of the Literature," IZA Discussion Papers 4603, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).

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