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Learning to rent-seek: collective action and in-kind benefits in the public sector

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  • Franklin Mixon
  • Russell McKenzie

Abstract

The present provides alternative specifications for public choice models that analyse the determinants of a variety of in-kind efforts to obtain monopoly rights (or rent-seek). A variable relating to the age of states in the USA provides suggestive empirical evidence of the importance of societal stability in forming interest-group coalitions, as suggested by the work of Mancur Olson. In fact, when previous models are respecified to include 'age since statehood', political determinants of elegant restaurant dining, golfing excursions and limo services - all in-kind rent-seeking perquisites - become more evident and important.

Suggested Citation

  • Franklin Mixon & Russell McKenzie, 1996. "Learning to rent-seek: collective action and in-kind benefits in the public sector," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 3(12), pages 755-757.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:3:y:1996:i:12:p:755-757
    DOI: 10.1080/135048596355538
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Richard A. Posner, 1975. "The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation," Springer Books, in: Roger D. Congleton & Kai A. Konrad & Arye L. Hillman (ed.), 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, pages 45-65, Springer.
    2. Robert B. Ekelund & Robert F. Hébert, 1991. "Dupuit's Characteristics‐Based Theory of Consumer Behavior and Entrepreneurship," Kyklos, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(1), pages 19-34, February.
    3. Mixon, Franklin G, Jr & Laband, David N & Ekelund, Robert B, Jr, 1994. "Rent Seeking and Hidden In-Kind Resource Distortion: Some Empirical Evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 78(2), pages 1717-1785, February.
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    Cited by:

    1. Russell James, 2009. "An econometric analysis of household political giving in the USA," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 16(5), pages 539-543.
    2. Vitor Melo & Stephen Miller, 2022. "Estimating the Effect of Rent-Seeking on income distribution: an analysis of U.S. States and Counties," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 192(1), pages 99-114, July.
    3. Vitor Melo & Elijah Neilson, 2023. "Introducing an index of rent seeking: a synthetic matching approach," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 197(3), pages 471-487, December.

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