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The effect of entrenched boards on corporate risk-taking: testing the quiet life hypothesis

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  • P. Chintrakarn
  • N. Jiraporn
  • P. Jiraporn

Abstract

The quiet life hypothesis posits that entrenched managers are well insulated from removal and thus prefer to enjoy a quiet life, i.e. they tend to be less ambitious, avoid difficult decisions and engage in less risk-taking (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2003). We utilize the staggered board (or classified board) to test this hypothesis. The staggered board is a powerful takeover defence that enables inefficient managers to evade the discipline of the takeover market, thereby exacerbating managerial entrenchment (Bebchuk and Cohen, 2005). We find that managers entrenched by the staggered board adopt significantly less risky strategies, consistent with the quiet life hypothesis. In particular, the presence of a staggered board reduces the volatility of stock returns by 4.46%. We also show that our conclusion is unlikely affected by the presence of endogeneity.

Suggested Citation

  • P. Chintrakarn & N. Jiraporn & P. Jiraporn, 2013. "The effect of entrenched boards on corporate risk-taking: testing the quiet life hypothesis," Applied Economics Letters, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 20(11), pages 1067-1070, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:taf:apeclt:v:20:y:2013:i:11:p:1067-1070
    DOI: 10.1080/13504851.2013.783677
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    Cited by:

    1. Sammy G. Muriithi & Bruce A. Walters & William R. McCumber & Luis R. Robles, 2022. "Managerial entrenchment and corporate social responsibility engagement: the role of economic policy uncertainty," Journal of Management & Governance, Springer;Accademia Italiana di Economia Aziendale (AIDEA), vol. 26(2), pages 621-640, June.
    2. Sun, Jerry & Liu, Guoping, 2014. "Audit committees’ oversight of bank risk-taking," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 40(C), pages 376-387.
    3. Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Ongsakul, Viput & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2022. "Corporate complexity, managerial myopia, and hostile takeover exposure: Evidence from textual analysis," Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Finance, Elsevier, vol. 33(C).
    4. Chatjuthamard, Pattanaporn & Jiraporn, Pornsit & Lee, Sang Mook & Sarajoti, Pattarake, 2024. "Customer concentration, managerial risk aversion, and hostile takeover threats," The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 95(C), pages 268-279.
    5. Mavisakalyan, Astghik, 2018. "Do employers reward physical attractiveness in transition countries?," Economics & Human Biology, Elsevier, vol. 28(C), pages 38-52.
    6. Treepongkaruna, Sirimon & Kyaw, Khine & Jiraporn, Pornsit, 2022. "Shareholder litigation rights and ESG controversies: A quasi-natural experiment," International Review of Financial Analysis, Elsevier, vol. 84(C).
    7. Astghik Mavisakalyan, 2016. "Looks matter: Attractiveness and employment in the former soviet union," Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre Working Paper series WP1604, Bankwest Curtin Economics Centre (BCEC), Curtin Business School.

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