Financial reporting in the 1930s in the United States preserving the status quo

I use historical analysis to examine the effect of securities regulation on financial reporting relationships in the 1930s. Adopting Edelman's (1964) framework, I posit that the financial reporting provisions of securities regulation were ‘symbolic,’ i.e., not expected to be implemented, and therefore that passage of regulation did not change financial reporting relationships. I examine the correspondence between the American Institute of Accountants (AIA) and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), the Minutes of the AIA, and other primary sources to determine the impact of regulation. The historical record shows that the financial reporting objectives (uniform accounting and limiting management's accounting choices) of securities regulation were not implemented during the 1930s. I conclude that regulation did not improve the quality of data provided to investors and that empirical studies that use the pre/post SEC periodization model are not well structured. I also suggest that future historical researchers might adopt a more critical lens, such as Gramsci's corporate hegemony model, to see how passage of legislation masked the continued dominance of the securities markets by a privileged elite and diverted attention from more material questions.