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Justification of the choice of the concession mechanism for projects economically efficient for the infrastructure owner

Author

Listed:
  • Nikolay I. Dorogov

    (Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Russian Federation)

  • Ivan A. Kapitonov

    (Plekhanov Russian University of Economics, Russian Federation)

  • Ivan A. Kapitonov

    (Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russian Federation)

Abstract

In modern economic realities, the state is playing an increasingly important part, managing the economy to achieve greater social efficiency. From this standpoint, the crucial aspect of efficient application of the concession mechanism is the selection of project proposals that have socio-economic practicality. The purpose of the paper is to justify the choice of the concession mechanism for projects economically efficient for the infrastructure owner. The authors conclude that upon justifying the choice of the concession mechanism, it is important both to analyse the economic efficiency with the benefit of the best analytical practices of investment management in conjunction with budget efficiency evaluation and to assess the specific risks and probability deviations, factoring in the specifics of projects on creation of public railway infrastructure in order to evaluate and subsequently monitor the comparative advantages of the concession over the state law and other PPP tools.

Suggested Citation

  • Nikolay I. Dorogov & Ivan A. Kapitonov & Ivan A. Kapitonov, 2020. "Justification of the choice of the concession mechanism for projects economically efficient for the infrastructure owner," Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Issues, VsI Entrepreneurship and Sustainability Center, vol. 7(4), pages 3477-3487, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:ssi:jouesi:v:7:y:2020:i:4:p:3477-3487
    DOI: 10.9770/jesi.2020.7.4(60)
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. David Martimort & Flavio Menezes & Myrna Wooders & ELISABETTA IOSSA & DAVID MARTIMORT, 2015. "The Simple Microeconomics of Public-Private Partnerships," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 17(1), pages 4-48, February.
    2. Marina RUDENKO, 2018. "Mechanisms for Development and Realization of Economic Capacity of the Regional Population from the Perspective of Sociocultural Approach," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 9(2), pages 645-663.
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    4. Bent Flyvbjerg, 2014. "What You Should Know About Megaprojects, and Why: An Overview," Papers 1409.0003, arXiv.org.
    5. repec:hal:pseose:halshs-01109351 is not listed on IDEAS
    6. lena ZATSARINNYI & Natalya MALYKH & Yulia SEVERINA & Angelica GENDON & Anna MINNULLINA & Kostyantyn MALYSHENKO, 2017. "Current Trends in the Financial Market Development," Journal of Advanced Research in Law and Economics, ASERS Publishing, vol. 8(8), pages 2629-2635.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    infrastructure project; public-private partnership; state contract; economic efficiency;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G40 - Financial Economics - - Behavioral Finance - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • H50 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - General

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