The usefulness of financial instruments in assessing the bankruptcy risk of companies
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DOI: 10.9770/jesi.2023.11.1(11)
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References listed on IDEAS
- Harris, Milton & Raviv, Artur, 1988. "Corporate control contests and capital structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(1-2), pages 55-86, January.
- Riad Baha & Aldo Levy & Amir Hasnaoui, 2023. "Capital structure and default risk of small and medium enterprises: evidence from Algeria," Journal of Risk Finance, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 24(4), pages 523-536, July.
- repec:eme:jalpps:jal-08-2022-0086 is not listed on IDEAS
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More about this item
Keywords
stock exchange; economic analysis; financial analysis; early warning models;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- G17 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Financial Forecasting and Simulation
- G33 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Bankruptcy; Liquidation
- L61 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Metals and Metal Products; Cement; Glass; Ceramics
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