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Reciprocal cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma repeated with random horizon

Author

Listed:
  • C. Manuel
  • J. Tejada

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • C. Manuel & J. Tejada, 1995. "Reciprocal cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma repeated with random horizon," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 3(1), pages 97-116, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:topjnl:v:3:y:1995:i:1:p:97-116
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02574805
    as

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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Robert Axelrod & Douglas Dion, 1988. "Bibliography on the Evolution of Cooperation," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 32(3), pages 583-583, September.
    2. Per Molander, 1992. "The Prevalence of Free Riding," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 36(4), pages 756-771, December.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Stochastic Game; Supergame; Prisoner's Dilemma; TFT; 90D20; 90D15;
    All these keywords.

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