Author
Listed:
- Zigang Chen
(Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications
Sichuan Police College)
- Chaochao Fan
(Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications)
- Tao Leng
(Sichuan Police College)
- Long Chen
(Chongqing University of Posts and Telecommunications)
- Yuhong Liu
(Santa Clara University)
- Xiaoyong Li
(Beijing University of Posts and Telecommunications)
- Dongfeng Yuan
(Nanyang Institute of Technology)
Abstract
At present, confrontations in cyberspace are becoming increasingly fierce, and network attacks and defenses have become the main form of confrontation between parties in cyberspace. The maximum benefit can be obtained by using scientific decision-making. Traditional network attack and defense research mainly focuses on the relationship between network attackers and network defenders, but more is need to explain the benefits of the evolution of network attacks and defenses. Given this, this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model among network attackers, network defenders, and government regulators, analyzes the evolutionary stability of each participant’s strategy choice, discusses the influence of each element on the tripartite strategic choices, and further analyzes the stability of the equilibrium point of the tripartite evolutionary system. The research results show that (1) the timely supervision of the network by the government supervision department is conducive to enhancing the construction of network security and has strategic significance for the security of cyberspace; (2) the network defense department can obtain more effective defense measures when being attacked by the network; (3) the network defense party can analyze the strategic defense requirements that are more in line with its own benefits. Finally, we use Matlab2021a to conduct simulation analysis, verify the effectiveness of the evolutionary game model under different initial conditions, and put forward reasonable suggestions for network defenders and government regulators according to the conclusions of the analysis.
Suggested Citation
Zigang Chen & Chaochao Fan & Tao Leng & Long Chen & Yuhong Liu & Xiaoyong Li & Dongfeng Yuan, 2024.
"Tripartite evolutionary game in the process of network attack and defense,"
Telecommunication Systems: Modelling, Analysis, Design and Management, Springer, vol. 86(2), pages 351-361, June.
Handle:
RePEc:spr:telsys:v:86:y:2024:i:2:d:10.1007_s11235-024-01130-9
DOI: 10.1007/s11235-024-01130-9
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