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Heterogeneous expertise and collective decision-making

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  • Winston Koh

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  • Winston Koh, 2008. "Heterogeneous expertise and collective decision-making," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 30(3), pages 457-473, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:30:y:2008:i:3:p:457-473
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-007-0242-3
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Nitzan, Shmuel & Paroush, Jacob, 1980. "Investment in Human Capital and Social Self Protection under Uncertainty," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(3), pages 547-557, October.
    2. Sah, Raaj Kumar & Stiglitz, Joseph E, 1986. "The Architecture of Economic Systems: Hierarchies and Polyarchies," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(4), pages 716-727, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Steve Alpern & Bo Chen, 2022. "Optimizing voting order on sequential juries: a median voter theorem and beyond," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 58(3), pages 527-565, April.

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