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Freedom to veto

Author

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  • Marlies Ahlert
  • Arwed Crüger

Abstract

Several sets of axioms have been proposed to characterize rankings of opportunity sets in terms of freedom of choice. In these models it has been assumed that being in a position to choose from more options is preferred to having fewer options. We tested the empirical validity of that assumption experimentally. Combining a dictator game (a no-choice situation for the receiver) and an ultimatum game (the receiver can choose between two options) we investigated whether receivers prefer to have some freedom of choice (in the ultimatum game) over having no freedom of choice (in the dictator game) even in the presence of monetary incentives to choose otherwise. The experimental results show that a strong majority of players is not willing to give up the option to veto without monetary incentives to do so. However, players are often willing to trade their freedom to veto even for a small bonus. The higher the monetary incentives the more players give up their veto power. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Marlies Ahlert & Arwed Crüger, 2004. "Freedom to veto," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 22(1), pages 7-16, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sochwe:v:22:y:2004:i:1:p:7-16
    DOI: 10.1007/s00355-003-0273-3
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    Cited by:

    1. Ahlert, Marlies, 2010. "A new approach to procedural freedom in game forms," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(3), pages 392-402, September.
    2. Mitesh Kataria & M. Levati & Matthias Uhl, 2014. "Paternalism with hindsight: do protégés react consequentialistically to paternalism?," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(3), pages 731-746, October.

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