IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/sjobre/v58y2006i4d10.1007_bf03371662.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Anreizwirkungen kostenbasierter Verrechnungspreise und die Vergabe von Verfügungsrechten für Investitionen

Author

Listed:
  • Stephan Lengsfeld

    (Universität Hannover)

Abstract

Zusammenfassung Der Beitrag erweitert die jüngste Diskussion um die Eignung verschiedener Verrechnungspreissysteme zur Handels- und Investitionssteuerung in zwei Richtungen. Zum einen wird die Leistungsfähigkeit kostenbasierter Verrechnungspreise analysiert, falls die unmittelbaren Erfolgswirkungen kostensenkender oder erlössteigernder Investitionen nicht dem investierenden Bereich, sondern dem jeweils anderen Bereich zu Gute kommen. Darüber hinaus wird untersucht, wie die Unternehmensleitung Verfügungsrechte für diese Investitionen unter den Bereichen aufteilen sollte. Diese Entscheidung kann nur simultan mit der Wahl des Verrechnungspreissystems getroffen werden. Der Beitrag analysiert ist- und standardkostenorientierte Verrechnungspreise und diskutiert die Grenzfälle möglicher Zuständigkeiten: bereichsinterne Investitionen und Kreuzinvestitionen. Bei geringer Umweltunsicherheit und/oder hohen Investitionsrückflüssen sind standardkostenbasierte Verrechnungspreise in Verbindung mit bereichsinternen Investitionen vorzuziehen. Hohe Unsicherheit über Produktionskosten führt zur Dominanz istkostenbasierter Verrechnungspreise. Dabei sollte die Vergabe der Verfügungsrechte für Investitionen in Abhängigkeit von der Höhe der Investitionsrückflüsse erfolgen.

Suggested Citation

  • Stephan Lengsfeld, 2006. "Anreizwirkungen kostenbasierter Verrechnungspreise und die Vergabe von Verfügungsrechten für Investitionen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 477-505, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:58:y:2006:i:4:d:10.1007_bf03371662
    DOI: 10.1007/BF03371662
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/BF03371662
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/BF03371662?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jensen, Michael C. & Meckling, William H., 1976. "Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 305-360, October.
    2. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    3. Georg Noldeke & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1995. "Option Contracts and Renegotiation: A Solution to the Hold-Up Problem," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 26(2), pages 163-179, Summer.
    4. Jack Hirshleifer, 1956. "On the Economics of Transfer Pricing," The Journal of Business, University of Chicago Press, vol. 29, pages 172-172.
    5. Donald B. Hausch & Yeon-Koo Che, 1999. "Cooperative Investments and the Value of Contracting," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 125-147, March.
    6. Christian Hofmann & Thomas Pfeiffer, 2006. "Verfügungsrechte und spezifische Investitionen: Steuerung über Budgets oder Verrechnungspreise?," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 426-454, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Clemens Löffler & Thomas Pfeiffer & Ulf Schiller & Joachim Wagner, 2011. "Zentralisierung, Transferpreise und spezifische Investitionen: Ein selektiver Verfahrensvergleich," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(63), pages 1-33, January.
    2. Robert Ullmann & Mark Trede, 2015. "Interquartilsbandbreiten bei der Ermittlung von Verrechnungspreisen: Average-Methode und Pooling-Methode," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 67(3), pages 329-366, September.
    3. Robert F. Göx, 2011. "Innerbetriebliche Verrechnungspreise zur Koordination von Handels- und Investitionsanreizen," Schmalenbach Journal of Business Research, Springer, vol. 63(63), pages 34-44, January.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Bester, Helmut, 2013. "Investments and the holdup problem in a matching market," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 302-311.
    2. Göller, Daniel & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2014. "Breach remedies inducing hybrid investments," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 26-38.
    3. Matthew J. Baker & Joyce P. Jacobsen, 2007. "A Human Capital-Based Theory of Postmarital Residence Rules," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 23(1), pages 208-241, April.
    4. Bester, Helmut & Krähmer, Daniel, 2012. "Exit options in incomplete contracts with asymmetric information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 147(5), pages 1947-1968.
    5. Eitan Goldman & Gary Gorton, 2000. "The Visible Hand, the Invisible Hand and Efficiency," NBER Working Papers 7587, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 2004. "Agreeing Now to Agree Later: Contracts that Rule Out but do not Rule In," Edinburgh School of Economics Discussion Paper Series 109, Edinburgh School of Economics, University of Edinburgh.
    7. Pol Antràs, 2005. "Incomplete Contracts and the Product Cycle," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(4), pages 1054-1073, September.
    8. Olivier Meier & Aurélie Sannajust, 0. "The smart contract revolution: a solution for the holdup problem?," Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 0, pages 1-16.
    9. Mehrdad Vahabi, 1999. "From Walrasian General Equilibrium to Incomplete Contracts: Making Sense of Institutions," Post-Print halshs-03704424, HAL.
    10. Brooks, Richard & Stremitzer, Alexander, 2009. "On and Off Contract Remedies," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 290, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
    11. Patrick W. Schmitz, 2001. "Partial Privatization and Incomplete Contracts: The Proper Scope of Government Reconsidered," FinanzArchiv: Public Finance Analysis, Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 57(4), pages 394-411, August.
    12. Pol Antràs, 2003. "Firms, Contracts, and Trade Structure," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 118(4), pages 1375-1418.
    13. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans, 2020. "On efficient firm formation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 107(C), pages 1-12.
    14. Robert Gibbons & John Roberts, 2012. "The Handbook of Organizational Economics," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 9889.
    15. José Sousa & Xavier Fairise, 2014. "On the value of partial commitment for cooperative investment in buyer–supplier relationship," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 111(2), pages 151-171, March.
    16. Sandeep Baliga & Tomas Sjöström, 2009. "Contracting with Third Parties," American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 1(1), pages 75-100, February.
    17. Alexander Stremitzer, 2012. "Standard Breach Remedies, Quality Thresholds, and Cooperative Investments," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 28(2), pages 337-359.
    18. Robert Evans, 2008. "Simple Efficient Contracts in Complex Environments," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 459-491, May.
    19. Alessandro De Chiara, 2018. "Courts' Decisions, Cooperative Investments, and Incomplete Contracts," CEU Working Papers 2018_5, Department of Economics, Central European University.
    20. Lanfang Wang & Susheng Wang, 2009. "Convertibles and milestones in staged financing," Journal of Economics and Finance, Springer;Academy of Economics and Finance, vol. 33(2), pages 189-221, April.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    D82; L22; M41;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • L22 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior - - - Firm Organization and Market Structure
    • M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:sjobre:v:58:y:2006:i:4:d:10.1007_bf03371662. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.