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Reputation concerns in aid conditionality

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  • Ruxanda Berlinschi

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  • Ruxanda Berlinschi, 2010. "Reputation concerns in aid conditionality," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 5(4), pages 433-459, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:revint:v:5:y:2010:i:4:p:433-459
    DOI: 10.1007/s11558-010-9081-6
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    1. Mosley, Paul, 1996. "The Failure of Aid and Adjustment Policies in Sub-Saharan Africa: Counter-Examples and Policy Proposals," Journal of African Economies, Centre for the Study of African Economies, vol. 5(3), pages 406-443, October.
    2. Axel Dreher, 2009. "IMF conditionality: theory and evidence," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 141(1), pages 233-267, October.
    3. Robert K. Fleck & Christopher Kilby, 2006. "World Bank Independence: A Model and Statistical Analysis of US Influence," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 224-240, May.
    4. Mumtaz Anwar & Katharina Michaelowa, 2006. "The Political Economy of US Aid to Pakistan," Review of Development Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 10(2), pages 195-209, May.
    5. Ariel BUIRA, 2003. "An Analysis Of Imf Conditionality," G-24 Discussion Papers 22, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development.
    6. Svensson, Jakob, 2003. "Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it?," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 70(2), pages 381-402, April.
    7. Marchesi, Silvia & Sabani, Laura, 2007. "IMF concern for reputation and conditional lending failure: Theory and empirics," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 84(2), pages 640-666, November.
    8. Stone, Randall W., 2004. "The Political Economy of IMF Lending in Africa," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 98(4), pages 577-591, November.
    9. Kilby, Christopher, 2009. "The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 89(1), pages 51-61, May.
    10. Kreps, David M. & Wilson, Robert, 1982. "Reputation and imperfect information," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 253-279, August.
    11. Kilby, Christopher, 1996. "Aid and Sovereignty," Vassar College Department of Economics Working Paper Series 38, Vassar College Department of Economics.
    12. Svensson, Jakob, 2000. "When is foreign aid policy credible? Aid dependence and conditionality," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 61(1), pages 61-84, February.
    13. William Easterly, 2002. "The cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid," Journal of Economic Policy Reform, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 5(4), pages 223-250.
    14. Carsten Hefeker & Katharina Michaelowa, 2005. "Can process conditionality enhance aid effectiveness?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 159-175, January.
    15. Spiros Bougheas & Indraneel Dasgupta & Oliver Morrissey, 2007. "Tough love or unconditional charity?," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(4), pages 561-582, October.
    16. Dreher, Axel, 2002. "The development and implementation of IMF and World Bank conditionality," HWWA Discussion Papers 165, Hamburg Institute of International Economics (HWWA).
    17. Mr. Rodney Ramcharan, 2003. "Reputation, Debt, and Policy Conditionality," IMF Working Papers 2003/192, International Monetary Fund.
    18. Ozlem Arpac & Graham Bird, 2009. "Turkey and the IMF: A case study in the political economy of policy implementation," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 135-157, June.
    19. David Dollar & Craig Burnside, 2000. "Aid, Policies, and Growth," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 90(4), pages 847-868, September.
    20. Mueller,Dennis C. (ed.), 1997. "Perspectives on Public Choice," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521553773, January.
    21. William Easterly, 2003. "Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 17(3), pages 23-48, Summer.
    22. Axel Dreher, 2004. "A Public Choice Perspective of IMF and World Bank Lending and Conditionality," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 119(3_4), pages 445-464, June.
    23. Axel Dreher & Nathan Jensen, 2003. "Independent Actor or Agent? An Empirical Analysis of the impact of US interests on IMF Conditions," International Finance 0310004, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 08 Jan 2004.
    24. Graham Bird, 2008. "The implementation of IMF programs: A conceptual framework," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 3(1), pages 41-64, March.
    25. Easterly, William, 2005. "What did structural adjustment adjust?: The association of policies and growth with repeated IMF and World Bank adjustment loans," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 76(1), pages 1-22, February.
    26. Steven Radelet & Jeffrey D. Sachs, 1998. "The East Asian Financial Crisis: Diagnosis, Remedies, Prospects," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 29(1), pages 1-90.
    27. Axel Dreher, 2003. "The influence of elections on IMF programme interruptions," Journal of Development Studies, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 39(6), pages 101-120.
    28. Espen Villanger, 2003. "Company influence on foreign aid disbursement: Is conditionality credible when donors have mixed motives?," CMI Working Papers WP 2003:4, CMI (Chr. Michelsen Institute), Bergen, Norway.
    29. Graham Bird, 2001. "IMF Programmes: Is there a conditionality Laffer Curve?," World Economics, World Economics, 1 Ivory Square, Plantation Wharf, London, United Kingdom, SW11 3UE, vol. 2(2), pages 29-49, April.
    30. Maurizio Zanardi & Alberto Paloni, 2007. "The IMF, World Bank and policy reform," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/9823, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
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    Cited by:

    1. Alexandra Hennessy, 2017. "Good Samaritans vs. Hardliners: the Role of Credible Signalling in Greek Bailout Negotiations," Journal of Common Market Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 55(4), pages 744-761, July.
    2. Dietrich, Simone & Wright, Joseph, 2012. "Foreign Aid and Democratic Development in Africa," WIDER Working Paper Series 020, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
    3. Molly Bauer & Cesi Cruz & Benjamin Graham, 2012. "Democracies only: When do IMF agreements serve as a seal of approval?," The Review of International Organizations, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 33-58, March.
    4. Axel Dreher & Jan-Egbert Sturm, 2012. "Do the IMF and the World Bank influence voting in the UN General Assembly?," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(1), pages 363-397, April.
    5. Simone Dietrich & Joseph Wright, 2012. "Foreign Aid and Democratic Development in Africa," WIDER Working Paper Series wp-2012-020, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Conditionality enforcement; Reputation; O19; D82; D73;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • O19 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - International Linkages to Development; Role of International Organizations
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D73 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Bureaucracy; Administrative Processes in Public Organizations; Corruption

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