IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/reecde/v28y2024i4d10.1007_s10058-024-00363-z.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Quantifying the social value of a universal COVID-19 vaccine and incentivizing its development

Author

Listed:
  • Rachel Glennerster

    (University of Chicago)

  • Thomas Kelly

    (1Day Sooner)

  • Claire T. McMahon

    (University of Chicago)

  • Christopher M. Snyder

    (Dartmouth College)

Abstract

Booster shots for COVID-19 vaccines in the United States have undergone periodic updates to target circulating variants. However, the lengthy process of development, testing, and production has resulted lags between a variant’s initial detection and the corresponding booster's rollout, by which time the booster may no longer match the circulating variant. An innovation with realistic scientific potential—a universal COVID-19 vaccine, effective against existing and future variants—could provide much more value by preempting new variants. Averaged across Monte Carlo simulations, we estimate that, even under conservative assumptions on the arrival rate of variants, a universal COVID-19 vaccine would increase health benefits over variant-specific boosters by more than $900 billion. This social value eclipses the cost of an advance market commitment to incentivize the universal vaccine by several orders of magnitude.

Suggested Citation

  • Rachel Glennerster & Thomas Kelly & Claire T. McMahon & Christopher M. Snyder, 2024. "Quantifying the social value of a universal COVID-19 vaccine and incentivizing its development," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 28(4), pages 723-761, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:28:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-024-00363-z
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-024-00363-z
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10058-024-00363-z
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10058-024-00363-z?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Susan Athey & Juan Camilo Castillo & Esha Chaudhuri & Michael Kremer & Alexandre Simoes Gomes & Christopher M Snyder, 2022. "Expanding capacity for vaccines against Covid-19 and future pandemics: a review of economic issues," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 38(4), pages 742-770.
    2. William Msemburi & Ariel Karlinsky & Victoria Knutson & Serge Aleshin-Guendel & Somnath Chatterji & Jon Wakefield, 2023. "The WHO estimates of excess mortality associated with the COVID-19 pandemic," Nature, Nature, vol. 613(7942), pages 130-137, January.
    3. Guido Alfani, 2022. "Epidemics, Inequality, and Poverty in Preindustrial and Early Industrial Times," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 3-40, March.
    4. Rachel Glennerster & Christopher M. Snyder & Brandon Joel Tan, 2023. "Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Advance Preparations for Future Pandemics," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 71(3), pages 611-648, September.
    5. Alvin E. Roth, 2007. "Repugnance as a Constraint on Markets," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 37-58, Summer.
    6. Snyder, Christopher M. & Hoyt, Kendall & Gouglas, Dimitrios, 2023. "An optimal mechanism to fund the development of vaccines against emerging epidemics," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    7. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder, 2015. "Preventives Versus Treatments," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 130(3), pages 1167-1239.
    8. Michael Kremer & Jonathan Levin & Christopher M. Snyder, 2022. "Designing Advance Market Commitments for New Vaccines," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4786-4814, July.
    9. Warwick McKibbin & Roshen Fernando, 2020. "Global macroeconomic scenarios of the COVID-19 pandemic," CAMA Working Papers 2020-62, Centre for Applied Macroeconomic Analysis, Crawford School of Public Policy, The Australian National University.
    10. Ernst R. Berndt & Rachel Glennerster & Michael R. Kremer & Jean Lee & Ruth Levine & Georg Weizsäcker & Heidi Williams, 2007. "Advance market commitments for vaccines against neglected diseases: estimating costs and effectiveness," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 16(5), pages 491-511, May.
    11. Michael Kremer & Heidi Williams, 2010. "Incentivizing Innovation: Adding to the Tool Kit," NBER Chapters, in: Innovation Policy and the Economy, Volume 10, pages 1-17, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    12. Marcus R. Keogh‐Brown & Simon Wren‐Lewis & W. John Edmunds & Philippe Beutels & Richard D. Smith, 2010. "The possible macroeconomic impact on the UK of an influenza pandemic," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 19(11), pages 1345-1360, November.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Snyder, Christopher M. & Hoyt, Kendall & Gouglas, Dimitrios, 2023. "An optimal mechanism to fund the development of vaccines against emerging epidemics," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 91(C).
    2. Rachel Glennerster & Christopher M. Snyder & Brandon Joel Tan, 2023. "Calculating the Costs and Benefits of Advance Preparations for Future Pandemics," IMF Economic Review, Palgrave Macmillan;International Monetary Fund, vol. 71(3), pages 611-648, September.
    3. Kremer, Michael & Williams, Heidi & Snyder, Christopher & Goodkin-Gold, Matthew, 2020. "Optimal Subsidies for Prevention of Infectious Disease," CEPR Discussion Papers 15433, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    4. Michael Kremer & Jonathan Levin & Christopher M. Snyder, 2022. "Designing Advance Market Commitments for New Vaccines," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 68(7), pages 4786-4814, July.
    5. Susan Athey & Juan Camilo Castillo & Esha Chaudhuri & Michael Kremer & Alexandre Simoes Gomes & Christopher M Snyder, 2022. "Expanding capacity for vaccines against Covid-19 and future pandemics: a review of economic issues," Oxford Review of Economic Policy, Oxford University Press and Oxford Review of Economic Policy Limited, vol. 38(4), pages 742-770.
    6. David E. Bloom & Michael Kuhn & Klaus Prettner, 2022. "Modern Infectious Diseases: Macroeconomic Impacts and Policy Responses," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 60(1), pages 85-131, March.
    7. Mueller-Langer, Frank, 2013. "Neglected infectious diseases: Are push and pull incentive mechanisms suitable for promoting drug development research?," Health Economics, Policy and Law, Cambridge University Press, vol. 8(2), pages 185-208, April.
    8. Agarwal, Ruchir & Gaule, Patrick, 2022. "What drives innovation? Lessons from COVID-19 R&D," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 82(C).
    9. Michael Kremer & Christopher M. Snyder & Jonathan Levin, 2023. "Authors' response to Unjournal evaluations of "Advance Market Commitments: Insights from Theory and Practice"," The Unjournal Evaluations 2023-25, The Unjournal.
    10. Mueller-Langer, Frank, 2011. "Neglected infectious diseases: are push and pull incentive mechanisms suitable for promoting research?," MPRA Paper 40193, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    11. Burak Kazaz & Scott Webster & Prashant Yadav, 2023. "Increasing the supply of health products in underserved regions," Production and Operations Management, Production and Operations Management Society, vol. 32(12), pages 4212-4228, December.
    12. Eddy Bekkers & Robert B. Koopman, 2022. "Simulating the trade effects of the COVID‐19 pandemic: Scenario analysis based on quantitative trade modelling," The World Economy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 45(2), pages 445-467, February.
    13. Dubois, Pierre & Moisson, Paul-Henri & Tirole, Jean, 2022. "The Economics of Transferable Patent Extensions," TSE Working Papers 22-1377, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE), revised Dec 2022.
    14. Michel Callon & Alvin E. Roth, 2021. "The design and performation of markets: a discussion," AMS Review, Springer;Academy of Marketing Science, vol. 11(3), pages 219-239, December.
    15. Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis & Robert Slonim, 2011. "Rewarding Altruism? A Natural Field Experiment," NBER Working Papers 17636, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    16. Peter Coles & John Cawley & Phillip B. Levine & Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth & John J. Siegfried, 2010. "The Job Market for New Economists: A Market Design Perspective," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 24(4), pages 187-206, Fall.
    17. Muriel Niederle & Alvin E. Roth, 2009. "The Effects of a Centralized Clearinghouse on Job Placement, Wages, and Hiring Practices," NBER Chapters, in: Studies of Labor Market Intermediation, pages 235-271, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    18. Xiaowen Xie, 2023. "Analyzing the Impact of Digital Inclusive Finance on Poverty Reduction: A Study Based on System GMM in China," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 15(18), pages 1-20, September.
    19. Karlsson, Martin & Nilsson, Therese & Pichler, Stefan, 2012. "What Doesn't Kill You Makes You Stronger? The Impact of the 1918 Spanish Flu Epidemic on Economic Performance in Sweden," Working Paper Series 911, Research Institute of Industrial Economics.
    20. Joseph P. Newhouse, 2021. "An Ounce of Prevention," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 35(2), pages 101-118, Spring.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Vaccine; COVID-19; Coronavirus; Universal vaccine; Advance market commitment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
    • I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
    • L65 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Manufacturing - - - Chemicals; Rubber; Drugs; Biotechnology; Plastics

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:28:y:2024:i:4:d:10.1007_s10058-024-00363-z. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.