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Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower–lender relationship

Author

Listed:
  • Levent Koçkesen
  • Saltuk Ozerturk

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Levent Koçkesen & Saltuk Ozerturk, 2007. "Bargaining and exclusivity in a borrower–lender relationship," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 11(1), pages 53-68, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:reecde:v:11:y:2007:i:1:p:53-68
    DOI: 10.1007/s10058-007-0024-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Pitchford, Rohan & Snyder, Christopher M., 2004. "A solution to the hold-up problem involving gradual investment," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 114(1), pages 88-103, January.
    2. Admati, Anat R & Pfleiderer, Paul, 1994. "Robust Financial Contracting and the Role of Venture Capitalists," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 49(2), pages 371-402, June.
    3. Dirk Bergemann & Ulrigh Hege, 2005. "The Financing of Innovation: Learning and Stopping," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 36(4), pages 719-752, Winter.
    4. Francesca Cornelli & Oved Yosha, 2003. "Stage Financing and the Role of Convertible Securities," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 70(1), pages 1-32.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Relationship financing; Exclusivity; Adverse selection; Bargaining; Endogenous outside options; C78; D82; G24; G32;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • G24 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Investment Banking; Venture Capital; Brokerage
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill

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