An analysis of net-outcome contracting with applications to equity-based compensation
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DOI: 10.1007/s11142-021-09666-w
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More about this item
Keywords
Dilution; Moral hazard; Team compensation; Optimal contracting; Pay-for-performance sensitivity; Stock option;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D86 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Economics of Contract Law
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
- M41 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting; Personnel Economics - - Accounting - - - Accounting
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