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research notes and comments: Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms

Author

Listed:
  • Luca Lambertini

    (Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Strada Maggiore 45, I-40125 Bologna, Italy)

Abstract

The nature of the equilibria arising under spatial differentiation is investigated here in a duopoly model, where at least one firm maximises value added per worker. The study shows that if firms' objectives differ, there exists a subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies, which is possibly characterised by asymmetric locations. If both firms are labour-managed, there exists a (symmetric) subgame perfect equilibrium in pure strategies with firms located at the first and third quartiles, if and only if the setup cost is low enough. Otherwise, undercutting is profitable.

Suggested Citation

  • Luca Lambertini, 2001. "research notes and comments: Spatial competition with profit-maximising and labour-managed firms," Papers in Regional Science, Springer;Regional Science Association International, vol. 80(4), pages 499-507.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:presci:v:80:y:2001:i:4:p:499-507
    Note: Received: 16 March 2000
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2022. "Lifetime Employment and Stackelberg Mixed Duopoly Games with a Foreign Labour-Managed Competitor," Arthaniti: Journal of Economic Theory and Practice, , vol. 21(1), pages 27-42, June.
    2. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2024. "A labor-managed Bertrand oligopoly game with lifetime employment as a strategic commitment," MPRA Paper 121486, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2010. "Most-Favoured-Customer Pricing and Labour-Managed Oligopoly," Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade, Springer, vol. 10(1), pages 33-40, March.
    4. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2019. "Capacity choice in an international mixed triopoly," MPRA Paper 94051, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    5. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Wage-Rise Contract and Labour-Managed Cournot Oligopoly with Complementary Goods," MPRA Paper 88235, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Kazuhiro Ohnishi, 2008. "Strategic Investment In A New Mixed Market With Labor‐Managed And Profit‐Maximizing Firms," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 59(4), pages 594-607, November.
    7. Ohnishi, Kazuhiro, 2018. "Stackelberg Mixed Triopoly Games with State-Owned, Labour-Managed and Capitalist Firms," MPRA Paper 88222, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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