IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/mathme/v52y2000i1p39-56.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Communication situations with asymmetric players

Author

Listed:
  • Marco Slikker
  • Anne van den Nouweland

Abstract

In this paper we study situations where asymmetric players have restricted possibilities for communication. Extreme asymmetry results in a hierarchy among the players. We introduce a class of allocation rules for these situations inspired by the Myerson value (Myerson (1977)) and Shapley values with weight systems (Kalai and Samet (1988)). It is shown that this new class of allocation rules can be characterized by a consistency property, a fairness criterion, a property based on the hierarchy among the players, and an efficiency criterion. Furthermore, we show that the consistency property can be dropped from the axiomatic characterization when the fairness criterion is strengthened. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2000

Suggested Citation

  • Marco Slikker & Anne van den Nouweland, 2000. "Communication situations with asymmetric players," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 52(1), pages 39-56, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:mathme:v:52:y:2000:i:1:p:39-56
    DOI: 10.1007/s001860000057
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s001860000057
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s001860000057?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Zissimos, Ben, 2002. "Why Are Trade Agreements Regional? A Theory based on Noncooperative Networks," Economic Research Papers 269465, University of Warwick - Department of Economics.
    2. Alexandre Skoda & Xavier Venel, 2022. "Weighted Average-convexity and Cooperative Games," Post-Print halshs-03717539, HAL.
    3. Ghintran, Amandine, 2013. "Weighted position values," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 65(3), pages 157-163.
    4. Alexandre Skoda & Xavier Venel, 2022. "Weighted Average-convexity and Cooperative Games," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 22016, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
    5. Alexandre Skoda & Xavier Venel, 2022. "Weighted Average-convexity and Cooperative Games," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-03717539, HAL.
    6. Kongo, Takumi, 2011. "Value of games with two-layered hypergraphs," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 62(2), pages 114-119, September.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:mathme:v:52:y:2000:i:1:p:39-56. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.