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Strategic Manipulation Approach for Solving Negotiated Transfer Pricing Problem

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  • Julio B. Clempner

    (National Polytechnic Institute)

Abstract

This paper suggests an approach for solving the transfer pricing problem, where negotiation between divisions is carried out considering the manipulation game theory model for a multidivisional firm. The manipulation equilibrium point is conceptualized under the Machiavellian social theory, represented by three concepts: views, tactics and immorality. In this approach, we are considering a non-cooperative model for the transfer pricing problem: a game model involving manipulating and manipulated players engaged cooperatively in a Nash game, restricted by a Stackelberg game. The cooperation is represented by the Nash bargaining solution. The transfer pricing problem is conceptualized as a strong Stackelberg game involving manipulating and manipulated divisions. This structure established conditions of unequal relative power among divisions, where high-power divisions tend to be abusive and less powerful divisions have a tendency to behave compliantly. For computation purposes, we transform the Stackelberg game model into a Nash game, where every division is able of manipulative behavior to some degree: the Nash game relaxes the interpretation of the manipulation game and the equilibrium selection for the transfer pricing problem. The manipulation dynamics and rationality proposed for the transfer pricing problem correspond to many real-world negotiation situations. We present an example, that illustrates how manipulation can be employed to solve the transfer pricing problem in a multidivisional firm.

Suggested Citation

  • Julio B. Clempner, 2018. "Strategic Manipulation Approach for Solving Negotiated Transfer Pricing Problem," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 178(1), pages 304-316, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:178:y:2018:i:1:d:10.1007_s10957-018-1301-x
    DOI: 10.1007/s10957-018-1301-x
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Lakhal, Salem Y., 2006. "An operational profit sharing and transfer pricing model for network-manufacturing companies," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 175(1), pages 543-565, November.
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    4. Gio Wiederhold, 2014. "Valuing Intellectual Capital," Management for Professionals, Springer, edition 127, number 978-1-4614-6611-6, December.
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    6. Julio B. CLEMPNER & Alexander S. POZNYAK, 2016. "Analyzing An Optimistic Attitude For The Leader Firm In Duopoly Models: A Strong Stackelberg Equilibrium Based On A Lyapunov Game Theory Approach," ECONOMIC COMPUTATION AND ECONOMIC CYBERNETICS STUDIES AND RESEARCH, Faculty of Economic Cybernetics, Statistics and Informatics, vol. 50(4), pages 41-60.
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    8. Anil Arya & Brian Mittendorf, 2008. "Pricing Internal Trade to Get a Leg up on External Rivals," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 17(3), pages 709-731, September.
    9. Julio B. Clempner, 2017. "A Game Theory Model for Manipulation Based on Machiavellianism: Moral and Ethical Behavior," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 20(2), pages 1-12.
    10. Guttorm Schjelderup & Lars Sorgard, 1997. "Transfer Pricing as a Strategic Device for Decentralized Multinationals," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer;International Institute of Public Finance, vol. 4(3), pages 277-290, July.
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    Cited by:

    1. Clempner, Julio B., 2020. "Penalizing passenger’s transfer time in computing airlines revenue," Omega, Elsevier, vol. 97(C).
    2. Kristal K. Trejo & Ruben Juarez & Julio B. Clempner & Alexander S. Poznyak, 2023. "Non-Cooperative Bargaining with Unsophisticated Agents," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 937-974, March.
    3. Mai, Nhat Chi, 2020. "The Effects Of The Base Erosion And Profit Shifting (Beps) Action 13 On Transfer Pricing Practices: A Comparative Empirical Study Of New Zealand And Vietnam," OSF Preprints gq27c, Center for Open Science.

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