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Feedback Solution of a Class of Differential Games with Endogenous Horizons

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  • D. W. K. Yeung

    (Hong Kong Baptist University
    St. Petersburg University)

Abstract

In this paper, we consider a class of differential games in which the game ends when a subset of its state variables reaches a certain target at the terminal time. A special feature of the game is that its horizon is not fixed at the outset, but is determined endogenously by the actions of the players; conditions characterizing a feedback Nash equilibrium (FNE) solution of the game are derived for the first time. Extensions and illustrations of the derivation of FNE solutions of the game are provided.

Suggested Citation

  • D. W. K. Yeung, 2000. "Feedback Solution of a Class of Differential Games with Endogenous Horizons," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 106(3), pages 657-675, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joptap:v:106:y:2000:i:3:d:10.1023_a:1004665614745
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004665614745
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    1. repec:bla:econom:v:51:y:1984:i:23:p:235-52 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. repec:bla:econom:v:44:y:1977:i:176:p:409-14 is not listed on IDEAS
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    Cited by:

    1. Luca Grilli, 2004. "A Differential Game for Renewable Resource Extraction Asymmetric Players and Asynchronous Horizons," Quaderni DSEMS lg_cart_2004, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.
    2. Luca Grilli, 2004. "A Stackelberg Differential Game with Overlapping Generations," Quaderni DSEMS lg_elx_2004, Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche, Matematiche e Statistiche, Universita' di Foggia.

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