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Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium: existence and characterization

Author

Listed:
  • Ping Sun

    (Qingdao University)

  • Elena Parilina

    (Qingdao University
    Saint Petersburg State University)

Abstract

In this paper, we propose a new equilibrium concept, hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium (HAN equilibrium), which captures the heterogeneity of a set of players in terms of their relations to other players. We assume that the set of players is partitioned into two subsets: individually rational and altruistic players. An individually rational player maximizes her own payoff and an altruistic player behaves individually supporting other players, thus maximizing other players’ payoffs. We characterize the set of hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibria relative to a given partition of players. Existence conditions are provided. Additionally, we discuss the connection of the hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium with other equilibrium concepts and provide several examples to support theoretical results.

Suggested Citation

  • Ping Sun & Elena Parilina, 2025. "Hybrid altruistic-Nash equilibrium: existence and characterization," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(1), pages 1-29, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00926-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00926-6
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