IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v54y2025i1d10.1007_s00182-025-00925-7.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Discrimination in games under the veil of ignorance

Author

Listed:
  • Annick Laruelle

    (University of the Basque Country (UPV/EHU)
    IKERBASQUE, Basque Foundation of Science)

  • André Rocha

    (Pontifical Catholic University of Rio de Janeiro)

Abstract

In this paper, we study descriptive norms under the veil of ignorance in symmetric coordination and anti-coordination games. We consider a finite population formed by different types of individuals. Players observe the type of their opponent but play under the veil of ignorance, i.e., act as if they did not know their own type. The question that we address is whether in such a symmetric environment a discriminating norm may arise. We show that there exist symmetric Nash equilibria in which players discriminate by acting differently according to the type of opponent that they face in anti-coordination games, while no such equilibrium exists in coordination games. Whenever individuals display a discriminating behavior, it is equally adopted by all agents, including by the individuals of the discriminated group. However, discrimination has a limit: the maximum number of groups where the treatment differs is three.

Suggested Citation

  • Annick Laruelle & André Rocha, 2025. "Discrimination in games under the veil of ignorance," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 54(1), pages 1-13, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00925-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s00182-025-00925-7
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00182-025-00925-7
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00182-025-00925-7?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:54:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00182-025-00925-7. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.