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The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games

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  • Kiho Yoon

Abstract

We study the effect of asynchronous choice structure on the possibility of cooperation in repeated strategic situations. We model the strategic situations as asynchronously repeated games, and define two notions of effective minimax value. We show that the order of players’ moves generally affects the effective minimax value of the asynchronously repeated game in significant ways, but the order of moves becomes irrelevant when the stage game satisfies the non-equivalent utilities (NEU) condition. We then prove the Folk Theorem that a payoff vector can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome with correlation device if and only if it dominates the effective minimax value. These results, in particular, imply both Lagunoff and Matsui’s (1997) result and Yoon (2001)’s result on asynchronously repeated games. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Kiho Yoon, 2004. "The effective minimax value of asynchronously repeated games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 32(4), pages 431-442, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:32:y:2004:i:4:p:431-442
    DOI: 10.1007/s001820300161
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    Cited by:

    1. Takahashi, Satoru & Wen, Quan, 2003. "On asynchronously repeated games," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 79(2), pages 239-245, May.
    2. Yevgeny Tsodikovich, 2021. "The worst-case payoff in games with stochastic revision opportunities," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 300(1), pages 205-224, May.

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