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Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems

Author

Listed:
  • Bettina Klaus

    (Department of Economics, University of Nebraska-Lincoln, Lincoln, NE 68588-0489, USA; e-mail: bklaus1@unl.edu)

  • Eiichi Miyagawa

    (Department of Economics, Columbia University, 420 West 118th Street, New York, NY 10027, USA; e-mail: em437@columbia.edu)

Abstract

We consider a problem of allocating indivisible objects when agents may desire to consume more than one object and no monetary transfers are allowed. We are interested in allocation rules that satisfy desirable properties from an economic and social point of view. In addition to strategy-proofness and Pareto efficiency, we consider consistency and two solidarity properties (replacement-domination and population-monotonicity). In most of the cases, these properties are satisfied only by serially dictatorial rules.

Suggested Citation

  • Bettina Klaus & Eiichi Miyagawa, 2002. "Strategy-proofness, solidarity, and consistency for multiple assignment problems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 30(3), pages 421-435.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:30:y:2002:i:3:p:421-435
    Note: Received: November 1999/Final version: December 2001
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