IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/jogath/v24y1995i3p273-92.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A Value for Continuously-Many-Choice Cooperative Games

Author

Listed:
  • Hsiao, Chih-Ru

Abstract

We extend a multi-choice cooperative game to a continuously-many-choice cooperative game. The set of all continuously-many-choice cooperative games is isomorphic to the set of all cooperative fuzzy games. A continuously-many-choice cooperative game and a cooperative fuzzy game have different physical interpretations. We define a value for the continuously-many-choice cooperative game and show that the value for the continuously-many-choice cooperative game has most properties as the traditional Shapley value does. Also, we give a probabilistic interpretation for the value. The probabilistic interpretation reveals some interesting properties of the value. Finally, we discuss the uniqueness of the value.

Suggested Citation

  • Hsiao, Chih-Ru, 1995. "A Value for Continuously-Many-Choice Cooperative Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 24(3), pages 273-292.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:3:p:273-92
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
    1. Check below whether another version of this item is available online.
    2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
    3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Calvo, Emilio & Santos, Juan Carlos, 2000. "A value for multichoice games," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 40(3), pages 341-354, November.
    2. Hsiao, Chih-Ru, 2011. "A Review on Liao’s Dissertation Entitled “The Solutions on Multi-choice Games” and Related Publications," MPRA Paper 30260, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Tsurumi, Masayo & Tanino, Tetsuzo & Inuiguchi, Masahiro, 2001. "A Shapley function on a class of cooperative fuzzy games," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 129(3), pages 596-618, March.
    4. Molina, Elisenda & Tejada, Juan, 2004. "Linear production games with committee control: Limiting behaviour of the core," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 154(3), pages 609-625, May.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:24:y:1995:i:3:p:273-92. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.