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Repeated Price Competition with Increasing Marginal Costs

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  • Requate, Till

Abstract

We consider a repeated price setting game with firms facing increasing marginal costs and positive fixed costs. Besides setting prices, firms may decide to be not active. Since it is well known that there is no Nash-equilibrium in pure strategies in the stage game, we look for pure strategy equilibria in the repeated game and give a full characterization of all stationary symmetric equilibrium outcomes, supported by optimal penal codes (in pure strategies).

Suggested Citation

  • Requate, Till, 1994. "Repeated Price Competition with Increasing Marginal Costs," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 23(1), pages 1-24.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:23:y:1994:i:1:p:1-24
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    Cited by:

    1. Lambson, Val E., 1999. "A note on optimal penal codes in stochastic Bertrand supergames," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 65(1), pages 41-46, October.
    2. Jacobs, Martin & Requate, Till, 2016. "Bertrand-Edgeworth markets with increasing marginal costs and voluntary trading: Experimental evidence," Economics Working Papers 2016-01, Christian-Albrechts-University of Kiel, Department of Economics.

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