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Saddle Point Theorems

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  • Radzik, Tadeusz

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  • Radzik, Tadeusz, 1991. "Saddle Point Theorems," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 20(1), pages 23-32.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:jogath:v:20:y:1991:i:1:p:23-32
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    Cited by:

    1. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Jörg & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2010. "Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games," Working Papers 0500, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
    2. Duersch, Peter & Oechssler, Joerg & Schipper, Burkhard C, 2010. "Pure Saddle Points and Symmetric Relative Payoff Games," MPRA Paper 20864, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    3. Ismail, M.S., 2014. "A sufficient condition on the existence of pure equilibrium in two-person symmetric zerosum games," Research Memorandum 035, Maastricht University, Graduate School of Business and Economics (GSBE).
    4. Lee, SangMok, 2012. "The testable implications of zero-sum games," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 39-46.
    5. Peter Duersch & Jörg Oechssler & Burkhard Schipper, 2012. "Pure strategy equilibria in symmetric two-player zero-sum games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 41(3), pages 553-564, August.
    6. Wojciech Połowczuk & Piotr Więcek & Tadeusz Radzik, 2007. "On the existence of almost-pure-strategy Nash equilibrium in n-person finite games," Mathematical Methods of Operations Research, Springer;Gesellschaft für Operations Research (GOR);Nederlands Genootschap voor Besliskunde (NGB), vol. 65(1), pages 141-152, February.

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