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The internal fragility of representative democracy: was Schumpeter right?

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  • Massimo Egidi

    (Luiss University)

Abstract

In recent decades, the rapid emergence of new political leaders capturing growing social discontent with populist promises has highlighted elements of the internal fragility of democracy. Schumpeter predicts such fragility in Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, where, in analyzing thse “competitive struggle for the popular vote,” he makes two assumptions that reverse the classical model of rational decision-making: the limited use of “conscious rationality” by voters and the potential unfairness of political leaders. These two elements introduce systematic distortions into the process of collective decision-making in democracy, suggesting a possible explanation for the rise of populism. Based on delegation, representative democracy must function despite the small amount of intellectual effort that most citizens put into forming their political opinions. Ideologies have historically functioned as implicit heuristics, allowing citizens to evaluate political facts, shape their expectations, and simplify political reasoning; as such, they have been the tools used by parties to give credibility to their programs while at the same time affiliating and polarizing the electorate. While they continue to serve as anchors for defining political identity, today's ideologies are fragmented and therefore less effective in supporting long-term programs and retaining voters; thus, keeping voters close to their political affiliation requires massive use of the media, and for emerging parties lacking strong identitarian values, a short-term political offer becomes less risky than formulating long-term political strategies. At the same time, the decline of classical ideologies makes any political commitment to long-term perspectives hardly credible to the electorate. This leads to an adverse selection process in which populist programs have a better chance of success than long-term policy programs. As a result, the role of the political leader as an entrepreneur is severely weakened. The competition for votes becomes unfair (since it is not based on the quality or plausibility of policy results), while at the same time the process of polarization disrupts the elements of mediation. The result is a process of democratic backsliding that can ultimately lead to a loss of trust in democracy.

Suggested Citation

  • Massimo Egidi, 2023. "The internal fragility of representative democracy: was Schumpeter right?," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 33(3), pages 645-670, July.
  • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:33:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s00191-023-00820-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-023-00820-y
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Social impact of I.A; Schumpeter; Voting; Democracy; Ideologies;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B3 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought: Individuals
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances; Revolutions

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