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The outsourcing productivity paradox: total outsourcing, organisational innovation, and long run productivity growth

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  • Paul Windrum
  • Andreas Reinstaller
  • Christopher Bull

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  • Paul Windrum & Andreas Reinstaller & Christopher Bull, 2009. "The outsourcing productivity paradox: total outsourcing, organisational innovation, and long run productivity growth," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 197-229, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joevec:v:19:y:2009:i:2:p:197-229
    DOI: 10.1007/s00191-008-0122-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. G. Fagiolo & C. Birchenhall & P. Windrum, 2007. "Empirical Validation in Agent-based Models: Introduction to the Special Issue," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 30(3), pages 189-194, October.
    2. Marengo, Luigi & Dosi, Giovanni, 2005. "Division of labor, organizational coordination and market mechanisms in collective problem-solving," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 303-326, October.
    3. Aghion, Philippe & Dewatripont, Mathias & Rey, Patrick, 1994. "Renegotiation Design with Unverifiable Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 62(2), pages 257-282, March.
    4. Richard N. Langlois, 2002. "Modularity in Technology and Organization," Chapters, in: Nicolai J. Foss & Peter G. Klein (ed.), Entrepreneurship and the Firm, chapter 2, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    5. Silverberg, Gerald & Verspagen, Bart, 1994. "Collective Learning, Innovation and Growth in a Boundedly Rational, Evolutionary World," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 207-226, September.
    6. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1999. "Foundations of Incomplete Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 66(1), pages 115-138.
    7. Young, Allyn A., 1928. "Increasing Returns and Economic Progress," History of Economic Thought Articles, McMaster University Archive for the History of Economic Thought, vol. 38, pages 527-542.
    8. Andreas Reinstaller & Werner Hölzl, 2004. "Complementarity constraints and induced innovation: some evidence from the first IT regime," Chapters, in: John Foster & Werner Hölzl (ed.), Applied Evolutionary Economics and Complex Systems, chapter 6, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    9. John Foster & Werner Hölzl (ed.), 2004. "Applied Evolutionary Economics and Complex Systems," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 3061.
    10. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August.
    11. Gallouj, Faiz & Weinstein, Olivier, 1997. "Innovation in services," Research Policy, Elsevier, vol. 26(4-5), pages 537-556, December.
    12. Kauffman, Stuart & Lobo, Jose & Macready, William G., 2000. "Optimal search on a technology landscape," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(2), pages 141-166, October.
    13. Hart, Oliver D & Moore, John, 1988. "Incomplete Contracts and Renegotiation," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(4), pages 755-785, July.
    14. James G. March, 1991. "Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning," Organization Science, INFORMS, vol. 2(1), pages 71-87, February.
    15. Herbert A. Simon, 2002. "Near decomposability and the speed of evolution," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 11(3), pages 587-599, June.
    16. Paul Nightingale & Tim Brady & Andrew Davies & Jeremy Hall, 2003. "Capacity utilization revisited: software, control and the growth of large technical systems," Industrial and Corporate Change, Oxford University Press and the Associazione ICC, vol. 12(3), pages 477-517, June.
    17. Carlo Gianelle & Giuseppe Tattara, 2009. "Manufacturing Abroad While Making Profits at Home: The Veneto Footwear clothing industry," Chapters, in: Mario Morroni (ed.), Corporate Governance, Organization and the Firm, chapter 10, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    18. Harberger, Arnold C, 1998. "A Vision of the Growth Process," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 88(1), pages 1-32, March.
    19. Klein, Benjamin & Crawford, Robert G & Alchian, Armen A, 1978. "Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and the Competitive Contracting Process," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 21(2), pages 297-326, October.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Outsourcing; Organisational innovation; Long run productivity development; D23; D24; D83; O33;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D23 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Organizational Behavior; Transaction Costs; Property Rights
    • D24 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Production; Cost; Capital; Capital, Total Factor, and Multifactor Productivity; Capacity
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness
    • O33 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - Innovation; Research and Development; Technological Change; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Technological Change: Choices and Consequences; Diffusion Processes

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