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Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core (*)

Author

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  • Frank H. Page Jr.

    (Department of Finance, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, AL 35487, USA)

Abstract

We provide an alternative proof of the existence of core allocations in exchange economies with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces. We also identify a critical feature of information sharing rules that ensures nonemptiness of the core. In essence, the only condition we require on the sharing rules is that profitable "insider trading" be prohibited. In the absence of insider trading, balancedness is guaranteed and core nonemptiness follows.

Suggested Citation

  • Frank H. Page Jr., 1996. "Market games with differential information and infinite dimensional commodity spaces: the core (*)," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 9(1), pages 151-159.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:9:y:1996:i:1:p:151-159
    Note: Received: August 21, 1994; revised version September 5, 1995
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    Cited by:

    1. Beth Allen, 2006. "Market games with asymmetric information: the core," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(2), pages 465-487, October.
    2. Forges, Francoise & Minelli, Enrico & Vohra, Rajiv, 2002. "Incentives and the core of an exchange economy: a survey," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 1-41, September.
    3. Ichiishi, Tatsuro & 市石, 達郎 & Yamazaki, Akira & 山崎, 昭, 2002. "Preliminary Results for Cooperative Extensions of the Bayesian Game," Discussion Papers 2001-09, Graduate School of Economics, Hitotsubashi University.
    4. Carlos Hervés-Beloso & V. Martins-da-Rocha & Paulo Monteiro, 2009. "Equilibrium theory with asymmetric information and infinitely many states," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 38(2), pages 295-320, February.

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