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Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents

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  • Jean-Michel Benkert

    (University of Bern)

Abstract

We introduce expectations-based loss aversion, which can explain the empirically well-documented endowment and attachment effect, into the classical bilateral-trade setting (Myerson and Satterthwaite in J. Econ. Theory 29:265–281, 1983). We derive optimal mechanisms for different objectives and find that relative to no loss aversion, the platform designer optimally provides agents with partial insurance in the ownership dimension and with full insurance in the money dimension. Notably, the former is achieved either by increasing or decreasing the trade frequency, depending on the distribution of types. Finally, we show that the impossibility of inducing materially efficient trade persists with loss aversion.

Suggested Citation

  • Jean-Michel Benkert, 2025. "Bilateral trade with loss-averse agents," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 79(2), pages 519-560, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:79:y:2025:i:2:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01591-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01591-8
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Bilateral trade; Loss aversion; Mechanism design; Endowment and attachment effect;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D01 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Microeconomic Behavior: Underlying Principles
    • D02 - Microeconomics - - General - - - Institutions: Design, Formation, Operations, and Impact
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D84 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Expectations; Speculations
    • D90 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - General

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