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The core of school choice problems

Author

Listed:
  • Kang Rong

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

  • Qianfeng Tang

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

  • Yongchao Zhang

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics)

Abstract

We propose a notion of core for school choice (i.e., priority-based allocation) problems. We say that a coalition of students is able to enforce a subassignment among them if, given their priorities at schools, other students together cannot exclude any student in the coalition from her assigned school. An assignment is in the core if no coalition of students can enforce any subassignment among them that Pareto improves their assignments. We show that all assignments in the core are Pareto efficient, and the assignment produced by Kesten’s efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance algorithm is always in the core. We also propose a natural refinement of the core and show that it is equivalent to the concept of priority-efficiency proposed by Reny (Am Econ Rev 112:2025–2043, 2022).

Suggested Citation

  • Kang Rong & Qianfeng Tang & Yongchao Zhang, 2024. "The core of school choice problems," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 77(3), pages 783-800, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:77:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s00199-023-01507-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-023-01507-y
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Core; Deferred acceptance algorithm; Pareto efficiency; School choice; Stability; Top trading cycles;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • D61 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Allocative Efficiency; Cost-Benefit Analysis
    • D78 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Positive Analysis of Policy Formulation and Implementation
    • I20 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Education - - - General

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