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Strategies in the principal-agent model

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  • James Mirrlees
  • Roberto Raimondo

Abstract

In this paper, we study the principal-agent problem. It is well known that in continuous-time, it is possible to prove the existence of an equilibrium $$ (u^{*},S^{*})$$ in a considerably general setting, and however little is known about the strategies themselves. Our goal is to present a universal way to construct these strategies as limiting strategies of a very simple type. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013

Suggested Citation

  • James Mirrlees & Roberto Raimondo, 2013. "Strategies in the principal-agent model," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 53(3), pages 605-656, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:605-656
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0706-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Martin F. Hellwig & Klaus M. Schmidt, 2002. "Discrete-Time Approximations of the Holmstrom-Milgrom Brownian-Motion Model of Intertemporal Incentive Provision," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(6), pages 2225-2264, November.
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    7. Avinash K. Dixit & Robert S. Pindyck, 1994. "Investment under Uncertainty," Economics Books, Princeton University Press, edition 1, number 5474.
    8. Holmstrom, Bengt & Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Aggregation and Linearity in the Provision of Intertemporal Incentives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(2), pages 303-328, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2019. "Robust Contracting in General Contract Spaces," Papers 1910.12516, arXiv.org, revised Mar 2021.
    2. Bastien Baldacci & Philippe Bergault, 2021. "Optimal incentives in a limit order book: a SPDE control approach," Papers 2112.00375, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.
    3. Chalioti, Evangelia & Serfes, Konstantinos, 2017. "Strategic incentives for innovations and market competition," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 52(C), pages 427-449.
    4. Evangelia Chalioti, 2015. "Incentive contracts under product market competition and R&D spillovers," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 58(2), pages 305-328, February.
    5. Julio Backhoff-Veraguas & Patrick Beissner & Ulrich Horst, 2022. "Robust contracting in general contract spaces," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 73(4), pages 917-945, June.
    6. Dylan Possamai & Nizar Touzi, 2020. "Is there a Golden Parachute in Sannikov's principal-agent problem?," Papers 2007.05529, arXiv.org, revised Oct 2022.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Agency theory; Principal-agent problems; Incentive schemes; Brownian motion; D81;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty

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