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Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One Sided Information Case

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  • Serrano, Roberto
  • Yosha, Oved

Abstract

We study a market with pair wise meetings of agents and with a one sided information asymmetry regarding the state of the world, which may be "low" or "high." We characterize the set of equilibria of the model, and study its behavior as the market becomes approximately friction less. For any one sided information economy there is an equilibrium where trade occurs at the right price (an ex-post individually rational price). Moreover, there is an open set of economies where in all the equilibria trade occurs at the right price.

Suggested Citation

  • Serrano, Roberto & Yosha, Oved, 1993. "Information Revelation in a Market with Pairwise Meetings: The One Sided Information Case," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 3(3), pages 481-499, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:3:y:1993:i:3:p:481-99
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2010. "How Optimism Leads to Price Discovery and Efficiency in a Dynamic Matching Market," Working Papers 10004, Concordia University, Department of Economics.
    2. Serrano, Roberto, 2002. "Decentralized information and the Walrasian outcome: a pairwise meetings market with private values," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 38(1-2), pages 65-89, September.
    3. Roberto Serrano, 2007. "Bargaining," Working Papers 2007-06, Instituto Madrileño de Estudios Avanzados (IMDEA) Ciencias Sociales.
    4. Palazzo, Francesco, 2017. "Search costs and the severity of adverse selection," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(1), pages 171-197.
    5. Dipjyoti Majumdar & Artyom Shneyerov & Huan Xie, 2016. "An optimistic search equilibrium," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 20(2), pages 89-114, June.
    6. Isaac Tanguy, 2010. "Information Revelation in Markets with Pairwise Meetings: Complete Revelation in Dynamic Analysis," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-17, January.
    7. Corominas-Bosch, Margarida, 2004. "Bargaining in a network of buyers and sellers," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 115(1), pages 35-77, March.
    8. Max R. Blouin & Roberto Serrano, 2001. "A Decentralized Market with Common Values Uncertainty: Non-Steady States," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 68(2), pages 323-346.
    9. Palazzo, Francesco & Zhang, Min, 2017. "Information disclosure and asymmetric speed of learning in booms and busts," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 158(C), pages 37-40.
    10. Isaac, Tanguy, 2011. "A new equilibrium in the one-sided asymmetric information market with pairwise meetings," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 61(3), pages 152-156, May.
    11. Max Blouin, 2001. "Equilibrium in a Decentralized Market with Adverse Selection," Cahiers de recherche CREFE / CREFE Working Papers 128, CREFE, Université du Québec à Montréal, revised Mar 2001.

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