Nash equilibria with Knightian uncertainty; the case of capacities
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-007-0276-x
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References listed on IDEAS
- Roman Kozhan & Michael Zarichnyi, 2008. "Nash equilibria for games in capacities," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 35(2), pages 321-331, May.
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Cited by:
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2014.
"Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, September.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2013. "Trembles in Extensive Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-606, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
- Thomas Jungbauer & Klaus Ritzberger, 2011. "Strategic games beyond expected utility," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 48(2), pages 377-398, October.
- Roman Kozhan, 2011. "Non-additive anonymous games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 40(2), pages 215-230, May.
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"Trembles in extensive games with ambiguity averse players,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 57(1), pages 1-40, September.
- Gaurab Aryal & Ronald Stauber, 2013. "Trembles in Extensive Games with Ambiguity Averse Players," ANU Working Papers in Economics and Econometrics 2013-606, Australian National University, College of Business and Economics, School of Economics.
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More about this item
Keywords
Knightian uncertainty; Tensor products; Capacities; Probabilities; Nash equilibria; C72; D81;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
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