IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v24y2004i4p741-767.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Author

Listed:
  • John Boyd
  • Chun Chang
  • Bruce Smith

Abstract

It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, “underpriced” deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin/Heidelberg 2004

Suggested Citation

  • John Boyd & Chun Chang & Bruce Smith, 2004. "Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 24(4), pages 741-767, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:4:p:741-767
    DOI: 10.1007/s00199-003-0372-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1007/s00199-003-0372-5
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s00199-003-0372-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to look for a different version below or search for a different version of it.

    Other versions of this item:

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Antoine Martin, 2006. "Liquidity provision vs. deposit insurance: preventing bank panics without moral hazard," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 28(1), pages 197-211, May.
    2. Kai Ding & Enoch Hill & David Perez-Reyna, 2021. "Optimal capital requirements with noisy signals on banking risk," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 71(4), pages 1649-1687, June.
    3. Ms. Elena Loukoianova & Mr. Gianni De Nicolo & John H. Boyd, 2009. "Banking Crises and Crisis Dating: Theory and Evidence," IMF Working Papers 2009/141, International Monetary Fund.
    4. Jonathan Carroll & Shino Takayama, 2014. "A hierarchical agency model of deposit insurance," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 10(2), pages 267-290, May.
    5. Gersbach, Hans & Haller, Hans & Volker, Britz, 2017. "Deposit Insurance and Reinsurance: A General Equilibrium Perspective," CEPR Discussion Papers 11947, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    6. Volker Britz & Hans Gersbach & Hans Haller, 2021. "Deposit insurance and reinsurance," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 17(4), pages 425-470, December.
    7. cho, hyejin, 2014. "bank capital regulation model," MPRA Paper 54409, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    8. Skeie, David R., 2008. "Banking with nominal deposits and inside money," Journal of Financial Intermediation, Elsevier, vol. 17(4), pages 562-584, October.
    9. Boyd, John H. & De Nicolò, Gianni & Rodionova, Tatiana, 2019. "Banking crises and crisis dating: Disentangling shocks and policy responses," Journal of Financial Stability, Elsevier, vol. 41(C), pages 45-54.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:24:y:2004:i:4:p:741-767. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.