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Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem

Author

Listed:
  • Antonio Quesada

    (Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico, Facultad de Economía y Empresa, Universidad de Murcia, Campus de Espinardo, 30100 Espinardo , SPAIN)

Abstract

Arrow's theorem is proved on a domain consisting of two types of preference profiles. Those in the first type are "almost unanimous": for every profile some alternative x is such that the preferences of any two individuals merely differ in the ranking of x, which is in one of the first three positions. Profiles of the second type are "appropriately heterogeneous", with preferences similar to those generating the "paradox of voting".

Suggested Citation

  • Antonio Quesada, 2002. "Preference profiles sustaining Arrow's theorem," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(3), pages 623-627.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:3:p:623-627
    Note: Received: March 9, 2000; revised version: June 7, 2001
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Susumu Cato, 2018. "Collective rationality and decisiveness coherence," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 50(2), pages 305-328, February.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Arrow's theorem; Domain restriction; Paradox of voting.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

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