IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/spr/joecth/v20y2002i1p183-188.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets

Author

Listed:
  • Jacqueline Morgan

    (Dipartimento di Matematica e Statistica, Università di Napoli Federico II, V. Cintia, 80126 Napoli, ITALY)

  • Lina Mallozzi

    (Dipartimento di Matematica e Applicazioni, Università di Napoli Federico II, V. Claudio, 21, 80125 Napoli, ITALY)

  • Sjur D. Flåm

    (Department of Economics, University of Bergen 5007, NORWAY)

Abstract

This note deals with Cournot type oligopolies in which the market clearing price occasionally may be non-unique. A Stackelberg leading producer is present. Given that setting we explore continuity properties of the followers' reaction and provide sufficient conditions for existence of equilibrium.

Suggested Citation

  • Jacqueline Morgan & Lina Mallozzi & Sjur D. Flåm, 2002. "A new look for Stackelberg-Cournot equilibria in oligopolistic markets," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(1), pages 183-188.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:1:p:183-188
    Note: Received: June 20, 2000; revised version: April 24, 2001
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.de/link/service/journals/00199/papers/2020001/20200183.pdf
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Attila Tasnádi, 2010. "Quantity-setting games with a dominant firm," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 99(3), pages 251-266, April.
    2. L. Mallozzi & J. Morgan, 2005. "Oligopolistic Markets with Leadership and Demand Functions Possibly Discontinuous," Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, Springer, vol. 125(2), pages 393-407, May.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Cournot oligopoly; Stackelberg solutions; Nash equilibrium; closed correspondences.;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:joecth:v:20:y:2002:i:1:p:183-188. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.